

workshop to Aegina. It also affords an insight into the decorative 'program' of the stand as a whole. It is a commemorative piece for a particular chorus, and so presumably for a specific festival. Do both figural friezes, the jockeys and the singers, refer to the same occasion? If so this must be one that included several events, among them choruses and horse-races. It is just possible that the theme of the Menelas stand is the ancient Panathenaia.²³

GLORIA FERRARI

*Bryn Mawr College
Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania*

²³ Choruses of men and women at the annual Panathenaia, perhaps one of the events of the *pannychis*, are postulated mainly on the evidence of Euripides *Heraclidae* 777–83; L. Deubner, *Attische Feste* (Vienna 1969) 24. *Lysias* xxi 2 mentions *kyklioi choroï* at the same festival. The date at which the horse-race was introduced is unknown—on this point, see J. A. Davison, *JHS* lxxviii (1958) 27. Great antiquity is attributed, however, to the *apobates* race with the chariot; Marmor Parium, Ep. 10; P. E. Corbett, *JHS* lxxx (1960) 57. The horse-race is shown on late sixth century BC Panathenaic amphorae—G. von Brauchitsch, *Die panathenaischen Preisamphoren* (Leipzig and Berlin 1910) 132–3—but an earlier picture of a winner is on the neck-amphora Athens 559, *ABV*, 85 no. 1 (middle), of c. 570 BC. This vase is remarkably similar to canonical Panathenaic amphorae in shape and dimensions (on which see A. Johnston, *BSA* lxxiii [1978] 134–5), and was published by S. Paspapyridi-Karouzou, *AJA* xlii (1938) 495–505, as a 'proto-Panathenaic' piece. On seventh century BC representations of horsemen and races, see *supra*, n. 6. The other side of Athens 559 has a picture of a flautist between men wearing long cloaks, possibly a chorus; here too one finds a large bird, in front of the flautist.

A gold diadem from Aegina

A recent discovery on the island of Aegina by Professor H. Walter (University of Salzburg)¹ throws a new light on the origins of the so-called Aegina Treasure in the British Museum.²

In 1982 the Austrians were excavating the Bronze Age settlement on Cape Kolonna, to the north-west of Aegina town. Immediately to the east of the ruined Temple of Apollo, and close to the South Gate of the prehistoric Lower Town, they found an unrobbed shaft grave containing the burial of a warrior. The grave-goods (now exhibited in the splendid new Museum on the Kolonna site) included a bronze sword with a gold and ivory hilt, three bronze daggers, one with gold fittings, a bronze spear-head, arrowheads of obsidian, boar's tusks from a helmet, and fragments of a gold diadem (PLATE Va). The grave also contained Middle Minoan, Middle Cycladic, and Middle Helladic (Matt-painted) pottery. The pottery and the location of the grave in association with the 'Ninth City' combine to give a date for the burial of about 1700 BC; and the richness of the grave-goods would suggest that the dead man was a king.

The diadem (with which this note is concerned) consists of a strip of sheet gold tapering at the ends,

I am very grateful to Prof. Stefan Hiller for reading a draft of this note, and making some helpful suggestions.

¹ *AAA* xiv (1981) 182. *Jahrbuch der Universität Salzburg* (1981–83) 105.

² *JHS* xliii (1892–93) 195–226. *BMC Jewellery* xiii–xx, and 51–6. *BMC Finger Rings* 115, 145. *BICS* iv (1957) 27–41. *BSA* lii (1957) 42–57. R. Higgins, *The Aegina Treasure, an archaeological mystery* (London 1979) (henceforth, *Aegina Treasure*).

which are drawn out and made into loops for the attachment of a cord or something similar; its total length, as restored, is 45 cm. The decoration, in dot-repoussé, consists of a row of vertical lines joined by crossing diagonals.

Apart from its decoration, this band is so closely paralleled by two plain diadems from the Aegina Treasure (PLATE Vb) that we may presume all three to come from the same workshop.³ It also recalls, in its form and in its decorative technique, the upper part of a composite diadem from the Fourth Shaft Grave at Mycenae, although the patterns are quite different.⁴ It would, however, be rash to see this diadem as Mycenaean rather than Minoan, since the method of looping the ends is standard in a number of gold ornaments of Minoan, or presumed Minoan, origin.⁵

Several conclusions can be drawn from this new discovery.

1. It confirms the dating of the Treasure between 1700 and 1500 BC.

2. My eventual conclusion that it was an ancient tomb-robber's hoard, reburied in a Mycenaean (LH IIIA) tomb on Aegina, just to the east of Cape Kolonna, is now clearly preferable to my earlier theory that it was found about a century ago in the Chrysolakko cemetery at Mallia and transported to Aegina.

3. It is tempting to see the original burial-place of the Treasure in the general vicinity of the newly-discovered shaft grave, so that the robber would in that case have reburied his loot close to where he had found it; a very reasonable thing to have done.

4. We can now accept with virtual certainty an Aeginetan provenance for the Treasure, which happily takes its place in the picture presented by the excavators of a rich settlement of Mainland type, tempered by a substantial Minoan element in its population and its art.

5. As the new diadem was worn by a man, it may well be that the two from the Treasure (PLATE Vb) were also from male burials.

REYNOLD HIGGINS

*Hillside Cottage,
Dunsfold,
nr. Godalming,
Surrey GU8 4PB.*

³ *BMC Jewellery* nos. 683, 684. *BSA* lii (1957) 49, no. 7. *Aegina Treasure* 33, ill. 30, no. 7. Length, 37.5 & 48 cm.

⁴ G. Karo, *Die Schachtgräber von Mykenai* (Berlin 1930) pl. 39 (top).

⁵ *Aegina Treasure* ills. 11, 14, 15, 22, 59, 62.

The Forethought of Themistocles

1 The Dates¹

The news of Xerxes' expedition is said by Herodotus to have reached Sparta before the rest of Greece and to have led to her consultation of the Delphic Oracle in good time for action, as would be natural. The implied date is late summer 481 (vii 220.3, 239.1). Athens also consulted Delphi at a very early stage (vii 139.6–144.3, 145.1). Most scholars have observed this implication²

¹ Professor Forrest has kindly read this article and discussed it helpfully with me. He assures me that he accepts most of my case: where he differs I have noted this in the text.

² How & Wells, *A commentary on Herodotus* ii (Oxford 1928) 181 on i 140.1.

but some have nevertheless refused to accept the date because of the apparent conflict of the evacuation decision which followed the oracle with viii 40.1 where the Athenians are said to have persuaded the Greek fleet retreating from Artemision in 480 to stop at Salamis 'in order that they might remove their women and children from Attica and consider what to do', and with viii 41.1 where he reports that a proclamation was now made 'that every Athenian should save his children and members of the household as best he could'. Both these passages ignore the decisions reported in the above-cited passages of Book vii relating to 481. Scholars who accept the 481 decree and the probability that some evacuation must have already begun have to say that this was merely a reaffirmation of an earlier decision. But it is not represented in that way in the text of Herodotus and the statement in viii 40.2 that a decision was needed because the Peloponnesian army had not appeared (as expected) in Boeotia implies that a new and unforeseen situation required a brand-new course of action. A possible solution of this problem is offered in the last section of this paper.

C. Hignett was particularly worried³ that an oracle in 481, after talking of shelter by the wooden wall and the need to retreat, should have specified Salamis as the scene of great slaughter. (This point, of course, does not disturb those who have the temerity to believe that the whole oracle is an invention *post eventum* and to dismiss the account of the debate on it in the Athenian assembly as a fiction—even though thousands of Athenians who lived at that time were still alive when Herodotus read his history in the city.) But Hignett was willing to believe that only the specific reference to Salamis was a later insertion.⁴ The apparent contradiction in Herodotus' narrative is perhaps superficial and, as with other apparent cases of confusion in Herodotus' narrative such as the dating of the Eunomia in relation to the Spartan attack on Arcadia (i 65.8) and the apparent placing of the arbitration of Periander in the war of Peisistratus over Sigeion (v 94.5–6), it is preferable to study his technique with care in order to unravel the knots.⁵ In the case we are considering this has been satisfactorily done by N. G. L. Hammond in *JHS* cii (1982) 75–81, and even if we do not accept all his subsequent speculation a date of 481 for the oracles now seems to be acceptable. If there is a genuine contradiction in Herodotus (which Hammond denies) this will be examined in Section V.

ii The Oracles

Hignett and Hands, as we have seen, doubted the ability of Delphi to foresee the importance of Salamis even if the oracle was not delivered until 480 when the pattern of events was much clearer than in 481. In contrast, Frank J. Frost⁶ shows a remarkable willingness to believe that the priests (or Pythia) were capable of

having worked out for themselves in advance that Salamis would be bound to play a key part in events without the benefit of hindsight or a tip-off. Frost suggests that even in 481 (where he puts the oracle) such a prediction would have been possible and he cites the position of the island of Lade in relation to the naval battle off Miletus in the Ionian Revolt.

Frost here seems to show too much confidence in the resources of the Delphic priests. Although they might occasionally pick up some knowledge of geography and political conditions from their clients and might transmit their clients' wishes on occasion (as with the appeal of Cyrene to receive more settlers)⁷ they should not be thought of as acting as a sort of 'Think Tank' in the ancient world. They did not have constitutional experts to draft a suitable constitution for Sparta or Cyrene: in the first of these cases the Rhetra must surely have been drafted in Sparta and merely received the blessing of the god: in the second, an arbitrator was appointed to study conditions on the spot.⁸ Although Cleisthenes of Athens thought it desirable to obtain Apollo's blessing for his radical changes in the tribal system, he is said to have left him only the final choice of ten names for the new units, even sparing the oracle the necessity of research for suitable ones by offering a list of 100 (*Arist. Ath. Pol.* 21.6).

There is no need to think that they were any better equipped in matters of strategic analysis or that as early as 481 they could foresee that the Persians or the Athenians would choose to fight a naval battle off Salamis. They were expecting a massive invasion by land, since Xerxes had already gathered a large army at Sardis. This army was expected to overrun Northern Greece (including Delphi) and Attica itself without the need for a battle at sea.

The possibility of a defence line against Persia in Northern or Central Greece only arose after the conference of the Greeks at the Isthmus. This came later than the oracles and the crucial assembly at Athens. At that assembly the Athenians had to plan as if they would stand alone, although they envisaged the possibility that other Greeks might join them (*Hdt.* vii 144.3). But in 490 only Sparta had come to her aid (without her League, some of whom seem to show similar lack of enthusiasm in 480/79); and as to the Thessalians and Thebans there were very mixed reports. At the Isthmus the decisions taken were very general and no specific plans were made to fight. The expeditions to Thessaly and Thermopylae were responses to specific needs as they arose.

The Athenians would be expected to fight on land in defence of their fields, or at least of their city. Even in 431 most Greeks still expected Athens to defend its territory since it was unnatural not to do so—and this would have actually happened if it had not been for the immense moral (not, of course, constitutional) authority of Pericles.⁹ How much more then would this have been the expectation in 481, when there had been no precedent for such behaviour. Only a man of extraordinary inside knowledge could have seen the possibility of evacuation.

In addition, a battle at sea was not an obvious likelihood. In the only clash of Greeks with Persians at

³ C. Hignett, *Xerxes' invasion of Greece* (Oxford 1963) 441–3.

⁴ A. R. Hands, *JHS* lxxxv (1965) 60 thinks even Salamis was included.

⁵ Mabel Lang, *Herodotean narrative and discourse*, Martin Classical Lectures xxviii (Cambridge Massachusetts 1984), makes some attempt to set out the problem but for more successful instances see D. L. Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus* (Oxford 1955) 154–7.

⁶ Frank J. Frost, *Plutarch's Themistocles* (Princeton 1980), esp. 100 n.

7.

⁷ *Hdt.* iv 159.

⁸ *Hdt.* iv 161.

⁹ *Thuc.* ii 22.1.

sea—the Battle of Lade in the Ionian Revolt—the Greeks had been routed (even allowing for special factors this would be discouraging), whereas on land at Marathon and elsewhere (in the East) Oriental troops had been trounced by Greek hoplites. It would surely be expected that they would trust in proven methods, as Sparta and her Peloponnesian allies certainly would if they chose to fight.

On the general abilities of the Delphic priests those who have given the matter the most attention seem to be the most sceptical. W. G. Forrest in *Hist.* vi (1957) 173–5 describes them as acting in the main like a rubber stamp, while Parke and Wormell *The Delphic Oracle* (Oxford, 1956) 170–1 have no doubt that Delphi's second oracle was inspired by the Athenian envoys after their disappointment at the pessimism of the first one, and that they must have been briefed by an insider—Themistocles. The oracle for its part ensured that the message was not so clear that it permitted interpretation only in one way. It would not, of course, have been in the interest of either Themistocles or Delphi to disclose that pressure had been applied to the oracle, and Herodotus would have been the last man to probe in this area; he says that it was the suggestion of a Delphian to consult the oracle again.¹⁰ Although obscurity covered its message so that, in the event of an Athenian disaster, Delphi could still claim accuracy, after the victory it could claim to be vindicated and in the general Greek desire to rehabilitate it (including what is surely the *post-factum* oracle about the death of a Spartan King) no awkward queries would arise.

In contrast, Hammond attributes less strategical insight and a more defeatist view to the oracle, suggesting that Salamis would be an obvious place of refuge for Athenians fleeing from the Persian invaders, and a probable site for a last stand. This would imply that Delphi remained pessimistic, as in the first oracle, and was in no way trying to hearten the Athenians, and that the pessimists in the Athenian debate interpreted the oracle in the way intended by the priests. If this is correct, then it was a brilliant and unplanned improvisation by Themistocles to interpret it as he did—and extremely fortunate for him that the epithet 'blessed' attached to the name Salamis gave him the chance to convince the assembly that he was right. The story would then confirm the quickness of his wits and his powers of improvisation but not his foresight, which Thucydides picked out as his greatest quality.¹¹ But there are grounds for rejecting this interpretation.

III *The Ships*

As noted, the building of a large number of new ships by Athens (at least one year before the oracle was given) raises the question whether Delphi could have inferred from this Athens's plan to meet the Persians at sea. It is

¹⁰ Hdt. vii 141.

¹¹ Thuc. i 138.3 τῶν μελλόντων . . . ἀριστὸς εἰκαστής. Thucydides also says that he was a brilliant improviser. Plut. *Them.* 4.10 apparently tried to reconcile Herodotus' belief in Themistocles' serendipity with Thucydides' emphasis on his foresight by suggesting that Persia was the real reason but that he thought it was too remote a threat to impress the assembly, so to them he stressed the more imminent one of Aegina. The difficulty in this is that only an engulfing danger would prompt a fleet so large and one which would require all available manpower.

certainly not a straightforward issue. In the first place, the timing of the debate was not due specifically to the growth of great apprehension of an impending Persian threat but to the accident of a rich strike of silver. If the building of such a war fleet is suggested to be merely a natural and normal part of Themistocles' continuing policy of turning Athens's eyes towards the sea (begun probably by the time of his archonship in 493)¹² it should be noted that this had not apparently included any proposal to enlarge the fleet. Even in the bitter struggle with Aegina of this period, a 'gift' of 20 ships from Corinth was taken as sufficient to meet the need.¹³ It is true that Herodotus does say that the Aegina war was the reason for the ships and seems to have thought that it was just good luck for Greece that they turned out to be handy against Persia. Professor Forrest tells me that he accepts this view, though he is prepared to agree that when the Persian threat became clear Themistocles was quick to see how the fleet could be used against Persia. Forrest stresses that, whatever Themistocles may have had in his private thoughts, he had to win a majority in this assembly and that for this the Aegina threat was more helpful. This is of course, very possible, but I find it hard to believe that the 'Aegina card' would have produced a vote for so many ships, for, even if only 100 ships were built (and not 200 as in some sources) the addition of these to the existing fleet would still bring the total up to the 200 level and this was surely more than was needed to deal merely with Aegina, which only produced 18 ships at Artemisium (Hdt. viii 1) and 30 at Salamis (Hdt. viii 46) though with others in reserve. Surely some 30 new ships would have been amply sufficient to overwhelm her and would still have left a handsome dividend for payment to voters who were less hostile to Aegina, more dubious about maritime development, or just greedier. The clinching argument that Themistocles had a more serious foe than Aegina in mind is surely that in order to man 200 ships the whole active male population would need to embark and there would be no land forces left to defend Attica. This must surely be designed to meet an extreme threat.

Herodotus' view seems to be increasing unconscionably the element of luck on which Themistocles' success is held to have depended. First, the accident of the need for ships against Aegina and then the carelessness of Delphi in leaving the epithet 'blessed' attached to the name of Salamis. Perhaps we would do better to accept the view of Thucydides, who praises Themistocles' foresight, saying that the Persians were expected.¹⁴

IV *Evacuation and Sea-Battle*

If it is agreed that the threat of Aegina was

¹² Thuc. i 93.3–4 says that Themistocles had been the first to urge on Athens the need to grasp sea-power and had begun to develop the Piraeus in his 'year-by-year' office. This is usually taken to refer to his archonship (ascribed to 493), though Thucydides' expression is awkward. The occurrence of Themistocles' name on ostraka of not later than 486 (ML 45) shows that he must have been active in politics by c. 487 and disposes of the argument based on Herodotus' description of him in 483 as 'recently coming forward', unless the hypothesis of D. M. Lewis in *ZPE* xiv (1974) 1–4 is accepted.

¹³ Hdt. vi 89.

¹⁴ Thuc. i 14.3. 'Themistocles persuaded the Athenians who were fighting the Aeginetans—and at the same time the barbarians were expected.'

insufficient in itself, then in the debates at Athens, both about the building of the ships and subsequently the interpretation of the oracle, voices must surely have been raised on the advantages of meeting the Persians on land with a defence of the civilian population and territory in the traditional Greek way. They had, after all, done this at Marathon with success, and the walls of Athens were not ample enough at that time to embrace evacuees if the countryside was to be abandoned. The superiority of hoplites was well known, though it was necessary to avoid the cavalry which were the enemy's greatest strength. In contrast, the record of Greek mainland navies was meagre compared with that of the Ionians, the Phoenicians and the Egyptians. Finally, it could have been argued that only a land battle could end the threat, as proved true.

It may well be the case that Aristides had Aeginetan connections¹⁵ and was reluctant to see Athens' sea-power so enhanced; and also that he put more trust in hoplites than ships. We cannot be sure if he opposed the building of so many and could therefore be accused of Medism, but his ostracism at this time makes it a tempting hypothesis, with some support from an ostrakon calling him 'brother of Datis' (the Persian Commander of 490). (If so, he showed as much flexibility as Cimon in adapting himself later to the world of maritime power and imperialism and thus stealing Themistocles' clothes.)

One of the most telling points that might be (and therefore almost certainly was) made by Themistocles' critics was that a fleet which was to be trebled over a short period could hardly hope to find enough skilled men to take the key posts on which the efficiency of the fleet depended—the steersmen, the boatswains and the other specialized members of the crew; the trierarch would need skill in this department if any sea-room were to be available to enable, and therefore necessitate, manoeuvre. Trained oarsmen were not so crucial—discipline, stamina and dedication were the qualities most required, and the man in the street, whether thetic or hoplite, could furnish these qualities. But the importance of the key men, well known to the Old Oligarch ([Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* i.2, 2.20) has recently been recognised and acknowledged by modern scholars.¹⁶ Athens in the 480s would, of course, have possessed enough skilled men to operate the 70 ships in her existing fleet but could hardly hope to produce nearly three times as many in a short period: experience was essential, not merely a crash course of training.¹⁷ It clearly was not possible for Themistocles to say that

¹⁵ He seems to have been in Aegina just before Salamis. If he had returned to Athens some months earlier he must have gone as an envoy, and in such circumstances an acceptable person would have to be chosen.

¹⁶ G. L. Cawkwell, *CQ* xxxiv (1984) 340. J. S. Morrison, *JHS* civ (1984) 55–6.

¹⁷ If J. Haas, *Historia* xxxiv (1985) 28–46, is right in claiming that Athens and Aegina only had pentekonteres until 483/2 the task of training men to man the triremes would be vastly increased since the crews of pentekonteres were much smaller in number and the techniques would be different. But it may be doubted if the Aeginetans could have produced a sizeable fleet of triremes out of the hat, as there is no evidence of a windfall such as Athens' silver. Moreover it seems unlikely that Aegina could have allowed herself to fall so far technologically behind her main foe and rival, Corinth, which *did* have triremes. Haas speaks as if her local war with Athens was Aegina's only naval problem.

there would be plenty of time to train men, since he wished to stress urgency, whilst the acquisition of experience and sea-lore would be slow, as King Archidamus of Sparta pointed out in Thuc. i 80.4.

There is also a problem about the manoeuvrability of the vessels themselves: Herodotus himself seems to endorse the Persian view that their ships were better sailors than the Greek (viii 10) and Themistocles warns against fighting at the Isthmus where the battle would be in the open sea and so greatly to the Greeks' disadvantage as their ships were heavier. The narrow water at Salamis will help the Greeks partly by discounting the numerical superiority of the enemy but also by preventing the use of sea-space for manoeuvres (Hdt. viii 60). One is forcibly reminded of the tactics of the Syracusans in the Battle of the Great Harbour, when the lack of sea-room prevented the superior Athenian skills of *periplous* and *diekplous* from being employed (Thuc. vii 36.2–6). In view of these passages in Herodotus and Thucydides i 49 (the 'old fashion') it is difficult to believe that J. S. Morrison and R. T. Williams are right in trying to identify an early instance of such advanced techniques in the account of the Battle of Salamis.

They also seem reluctant to acknowledge differences of design and construction between the ships of the different nations at this period, but such scepticism seems misplaced.¹⁸ The period in which the trireme came to replace the pentekonter as the main battleship is from about 520 to 480, and it seems likely that the most advanced naval powers were still evolving the optimum design which modern marine architects have so praised.¹⁹ Those which developed skills of manoeuvre would design ships for speed and lightness and would seek to use their rams as rapiers rather than bludgeons. Xerxes is made to pick 30 of his fastest ships in Hdt. vii 179 and Themistocles in viii 22, whilst the Aeginetans sent their 30 best for the front line at Salamis, so there could be variations even within one nation's fleet.

There is a tradition in Plutarch (*Cim.* 12.2) that Cimon built heavier and more thoroughly decked vessels to take more marines in the campaign before Eurymedon as if he were reverting to an older, pre-Salamis, style; but in the light of Herodotus' evidence it is perhaps safer to think that the evolution of the fully developed trireme and its tactics came in the period c. 460–35, so as to be perfected by the time of the battle of Sybota (Thuc. i 49.1–3) and Phormio's battles off Naupactus.

If variations in ship-design and handling are not accepted it is necessary to explain these passages by postulating that the Greek ships were waterlogged whilst the Persians had dried theirs out (as do Morrison and Williams) or, in the case of the Athenians, had been made, at least in part, of unseasoned wood due to haste (as does R. Meiggs).²⁰ But it is not clear why the Greeks should have had to keep their ships in the sea whilst Xerxes was in winter quarters, and the immature wood would not affect a substantial part of the Greek fleet—possibly only one-third of it. Also, Herodotus viii 42 says the Athenian ships sailed best of the Greeks. In any case Themistocles would have been aware of such

¹⁸ *Greek oared ships 900 to 322 BC* (Cambridge 1968) 154.

¹⁹ Morrison & Williams (n. 18) 134–5.

²⁰ *Trees and timber in the ancient Mediterranean* (Oxford 1982) 125.

possible handicaps and his plan would have had to take account of them.

It was certain, then, that the Athenians would be vastly inferior in numbers, and highly likely that they would be inferior in equipment and skills if they were to meet the Persians at sea. But the most serious problem for Themistocles in the debate about the building of ships must have been that if the confrontation was to be at sea the whole male population would be required to man the ships and there would be no possibility of defending Attica. (There was no certainty at this time that Sparta and other Greeks would act against an invasion of Northern and Central Greece.) The civilian population would either have to be abandoned or evacuated. It seems probable that the full implications of their decision were not recognized or, at least, faced at the time, since a full debate on strategy was still necessary after the Delphic oracle. But even if most Athenian voters had not worked it all out at this comparatively safe time, it seems clear that Themistocles must have known what he was doing. The building of the fleet implied the evacuation of Attica, though he may not have wished to spell this out too clearly at the time.

The apparent implication of Herodotus viii 41 that the decision to evacuate Attica was only taken after the fall of Thermopylae and the return of the Athenian fleet from Artemisium was always hard to accept: an attempt will be made in Section v of this article to explain how this version of events may have come into being. The passage where Herodotus links the decision with the debate immediately after the oracle in 481 makes more sense, since a commitment to a sea-battle at Salamis required the abandonment of Attica.

Apart from this, how much time could the Athenians have hoped for in which to complete the evacuation if they had waited for the return of their fleet? There was nothing whatever to prevent the Persian fleet from following hard on the heels of the retreating Greeks both by land and sea. The abundant Persian cavalry, if it had set off soon after the fall of the pass, could easily have entered the north of Attica within a couple of days and, if no order to evacuate had yet come from Athens, the population would have been caught without defence. The crews of the ships would have been forced to disembark and rush to defend them. Themistocles could not have foreseen the comparative slowness of the Persian advance (the fleet delayed three days in Northern Euboea and then took another three to reach Phaleron: Hdt. viii 66). It may be doubted whether even this respite would have been enough for the prodigious task of evacuating the whole population of Attica. (Herodotus makes it clear that the whole population was evacuated except for a handful: viii 41 and 51). The Athenian ships would have themselves taken most of two days to get back to Athens, so the Persians might have arrived one day later, whilst the orders to evacuate were still going out from the city.

It is difficult to think that the number of people that had to be evacuated was much less than 80,000, many of whom would be old and infirm or young and helpless. They would have to be summoned from the countryside, gathered at embarkation points and transported to the islands. Herodotus tells us that some took the short journey to Salamis, but others the longer one to Aegina, and most of them the even longer one to Troezen. This

would require the mustering of all available merchant and fishing vessels: triremes would not be able to carry many passengers and would in any case be required to protect the convoys from possible intervention by the enemy fleet. The round journey to Troezen would be a matter of many hours and it seems impossible to believe that the gathering of suitable ships would not have required planning in advance. Similarly, the mental preparation of old people to abandon their old and sacred hearths and shrines to the barbarians would need time: Pericles found this a problem even in 432/1, when the decision had been taken well in advance—and yet many were still lingering in their homes, unwilling to forsake them to the invading Peloponnesians (Thuc. ii 16.1–2).

If it is agreed that Themistocles could hardly be thought to have relied on luck to get a suitable oracle for his purposes and again to provide the necessary ships and time for the evacuation, then it is tempting to think that he must have put pressure through the envoys at Delphi to secure what he needed, whilst covering up the pressure and allowing enough ambiguity to relieve the panic-stricken Delphians of the threat of Persian punishment—and embarrassment if the Athenians should fail.

The specific choice of Salamis need not surprise us. Together with the Euripus it was the only narrow sea-strait adjacent to Attica, and it would have been dangerous to send the fleet up the Euripus if the Persians were occupying Attica and could send ships round to cut the fleet off from evacuees in Salamis, Aegina and Troezen. When, a year later, the Athenians agreed to send their fleet to Artemisium it was because other Greek states had agreed to confront the Persians on land as well as sea: the land forces were to defend Boeotia and Attica, and the fleet was obliged to defend their flank. There was still serious worry about an enemy circumnavigation of Euboea, until the storm destroyed the force sent for this purpose (Hdt. viii 13). Even after this, Herodotus says the Greeks were thinking of leaving their post before the fall of the pass (viii 18).

v *Myth and History*

If this account of events is correct, how did the version which seemed to put the evacuation after the fall of Thermopylae arise? Whether Herodotus himself implies this in viii 41 is not totally clear but there may well have been a *communis opinio* to this effect. The most likely explanation is the operation of patriotic myth-making—a phenomenon familiar in the history of most, if not all, countries, both ancient and modern. In the case of Athens we have an instance specifically recorded by an exasperated Thucydides (vi 53.3–54.2)—where the truth about the expulsion of the tyrants by Sparta is replaced by the more acceptable and romantic story of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. (One should note that this had occurred despite Herodotus' accurate account.) Another probable instance is the explanation in Herodotus vi 110 of the delay at Marathon before the engagement, allegedly due to a formal observance of protocol rather than to hope of Spartan help.

In the matter of the time of the beginning of the evacuation it seems possible that there was a popular desire to cover the lack of confidence on Athens' part in

the defence of Thermopylae and Artemisium (as previously of Tempe). Artemisium was in open water and therefore dangerous to the Greek fleet, as their defensive tactics show (Hdt. viii 2.1), while withdrawal to the Euripus would leave the route west of Euboea open. At Tempe there was no role for the fleet at all: Themistocles must surely have gone there with the Athenian hoplites to ensure that there would be no decisive action there. It would then have been the latest feasible time²¹ to begin the evacuation and to embark the whole of the fit male population as crew on the ships. Naturally there were no land troops to spare for Thermopylae, and Themistocles must have been on tenterhooks about the risk of suffering serious losses in a battle in the wrong place.

According to Herodotus (viii 40.2) the Athenians claimed that after the fall of Thermopylae they had been expecting the Peloponnesian army to be drawn up in the Boeotian plain. That is most implausible. There had, of course, been a promise from Sparta that she would send a full-scale force to Thermopylae when the festival ended, but after the pass fell it was far from clear that there was an acceptable position where the Peloponnesian army could maintain contact with the Greek fleet and defend Attica whilst avoiding encirclement. There is no Thermopylae pass in the Oropus area and substantial manpower was still tied up in the fleet. Could the Athenians ever have believed that they could leave their women and children in Attica to be defended by Peloponnesians even though there was no strong position to make this possible? Plataea was only possible after Salamis. There is no suggestion in Herodotus that any council of the allies had agreed to a plan to fight in Boeotia and, as has been argued, a decision to evacuate taken at so late a stage could not have been implemented successfully.

But after the great victory it was not tactful to remind Athens of this hard truth, any more than to question either the sincerity or the judgement of the Spartan arrangements at Thermopylae. The 'Themistocles Decree' from Troezen, at the least, whether it is based on a real document or is a very sophisticated forgery, let this cat out of the bag.²²

A. J. HOLLADAY

Trinity College, Oxford

²¹ So also A. R. Burn, *Persia and the Greeks* (London 1962) 361.

²² The suggestion of H. B. Mattingly (*Classical contributions: studies in honour of Malcolm Francis McGregor*, ed. G. S. Shrimpton and D. J. McCargar [Locust Valley 1981] 79) that this document would gain glory for Athens by showing her great prescience ignores the revelation of duplicity in pretending to be committed to the defence of Central Greece whilst showing by her actions her own disbelief in the policy. Herodotus offers Athens the best of both worlds by attributing the decision to 481 after the debate on the oracle (though not to 483/2) but leaving the impression that its implementation only came about when the fleet returned from Artemisium. He surely earned his 10 talents.

Onomakles and The Alopekonneseians

Oxyrhynchus Papyrus 3711 discusses Lesbian anti-quoties. In column ii lines 31 to 36 a quotation from Alkaios is followed by remarks upon Alopekonneseians who settled at Ainos. The passage quoted from Alkaios is already known (130 L.-P. 130 b 9–11 Voigt [P. Oxy.

2165, fr. 1 ii 17–19]), but the new evidence in the lemma has enabled the editor, M. W. Haslam, to make textual improvements. Haslam presents P. Oxy. 3711 ii 31–36 thus:

ὥς δ' Ὀνομακλέης ὠθ.γ.οσ
 εἰκήσα λυκαυχίαις φεύγων τ[ὸν
 π[όλ]εμον. Αἴνος Θρ[ά]ικης πόλις .[
 Αἴνου τοῦ Γερῶνι [
 δὲ τήν Αἴνον Ἀλωπεκον[νήσιοι,
 η[. . .] οὔντο δ' ὑπὸ Θραικῶ[ν.]η[ε]

After suggesting that the incomplete word at the end of line 31 was Ὠθάνασος, 'the Athenian', the editor asks concerning Onomakles 'was he an Athenian who had come to Lesbos and the Troad?' There is no mention of Alopekonneseians or of Ainos in the lemma, but Haslam states 'I can only suppose that Onomakles and Aenus are connected in some way which the comment proceeded to elucidate. But if the Athenians (given Ὠθάνασος in the lemma) had anything to do with Aenus in this early period, it receives no mention in our sources. We hear only of the clash over Sigeum (cf. Alc. 428.167), nothing of any other Athenian activity in the region. Alcaeus and Aenus: fr. 45, Ἐβρε κτλ, but no link here with that'.

However, there is evidence of other Athenian activity in the region in the time of Alkaios. Athenians with Phrynon, an Olympic victor, were present not only in the Troad but in the Thracian Chersonese also. Pseudo-Skymnos, having mentioned the Aeolians of Alopekonneseos (706), remarks

707 ἐξῆς Ἐλαιούσ, Ἀττικὴν ἀποικίαν
 ἔχουσα, Φρύνων ἦν συνοικίσαι δοκεῖ.

708 Φορβῶν (sine acc.) cod.: em. H. T. Wade-Gery, *Essays in Greek history* (Oxford 1958) 166 n. 2.

Thus Phrynon and his Athenian venturers were busy on both the Asiatic and European sides of the Hellespont.¹ Athenian activity at Elaiouss began in the last quarter of the seventh century BC; Corinthian and East Greek pottery has been found there, on the acropolis overlooking Morte Bay and in cemeteries.² The archaeological evidence from Elaiouss is consistent with chronographic data: Phrynon, whom Alkaios mentioned,³ was an Olympic victor in 636/5;⁴ about 620 he would have been senior enough to act as *oikistes* at Elaiouss, and a decade or so later he was no match for Pittakos in single combat—in 607/6 according to Eusebios.⁵

To the north of Elaiouss the neighbours of the Athenians were the Alopekonneseians, who lived beside

¹ L. H. Jeffery, *Archaic Greece* (London and Tonbridge 1976) 89–90.

² Excavations were conducted during the Gallipoli campaign and again in the period from August 1920 to January 1921: *BCH* xxxix (1915) 135–240; *CRAI* (1915) 268–9; (1916) 40–7; (1921) 130–6. J. Boardman, *The Greeks overseas* (London 1980) 265.

³ 167.17 L./P. (167.17 Voigt). Cf. 428 ab L./P. (468, 469 Voigt). Denys Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus* (Oxford 1955) 152–61.

⁴ Eusebios, *Chron.* i, p. 92 Karst. Eusebios states that Phrynon won in the stadion, but Diogenes Laertios (i, 74) calls him victor in the pankration (*RE* xx 1. 929 s.v. 'Phrynon [1]).

⁵ Armen. Vers. *Ol.* 43.2, Ann. Abr. 1409, *Chron.-Kanon* p. 186 Karst. Hieron. *Ol.* 43. 2, p. 98 b Helm.² A. A. Mosshammer, *The Chronicle of Eusebios and Greek Chronographic Tradition* (Lewisburg 1979) 246–54.